There is No Free Will, Only Will to Freedom  An Chin Chen , Allen Houng (Institute Of Philosophy Of Mind And Cognition, National Yang Ming University, Taipei, Taiwan)   C13

The subject of Free Will has been arguing in the philosophical world for a long time. After many years of philosophical theory development and the participation of scientific experimental results, there is still no conclusion yet. However, this concept has been widely quoted in our practical daily life, including the fields of moral responsibility, law, social culture and spiritual exploration. Its widely cited characteristics and multiple concepts and definitions have become the source of the research complexity of free will subjects. This presentation contains with arguments of denying the existence of the free will defined by the philosophical indeterminists and compatibilists by questioning the role of agent. There are also objections to the libertarian arguments according to the limitations of alternative possibilities and will-setting action. I am going to conduct a comprehensive reviewing and analyzing the definitions, premises and scenarios of notion of "freedom". It is predictable that the garble of definition and proposition of freedom leads to the different views. For example, compatibility theory focuses on the most macroscopic, consequential freedom of action and will; indeterminism focuses on the freedom brought by quantum jumps in the brain; while liberalism recognizes the unknowability of brain nerve operations, but decided to ignore this, thinking that the microscopic brain nerve operation does not affect our control over macroscopic activities which is unacceptable for hard determinists. Hence, it might be the right timing to rethink whether there is a releasing the current concept of freedom and reshape a new or even deeper sense of it. This presentation supports of the hard determinist Besides, the presentation also contains views from neuroscience. Benjamin Libet?s famous experiment in Do We Have Freewill is the most welcome by hard determinists and following Aaron Achurger?s experiment in The Neuropsychology of Conscious Volition as well. However, we found a little slit for freewill from the detail looking at conscious veto decisions. Recalling Orch OR theory of Sir Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff, OR events which generate the rich cognitive subjective experience could be enabling quantum computing in channels of microtubule proteins with environmental random interaction, and then a non-computable ?willed? influence without the environmental randomness anymore alone with the evolution development. We also found a chance to get rid of a pure randomness for consciousness if every time there is a will that is willing to recognize and act differently from the past It concludes that will does not come from being stimulated, nor on the purposes of making decisions or taking actions. Will is only derived from the self-awareness of the perception at the immediate moment, and together with the deep intention or desire to change the past perception and representation pattern. There is never "free will", but only "will to freedom".